Between Revolution and State: The Crisis of Jihadist Salafism in the Context of the Arab Spring (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham as a Model)

written by: abdelfattah elhidaoui

In 2011, the Arab region witnessed a wave of popular revolutions that swept across North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, in what became known as the “Arab Spring.” These revolutions marked a major turning point in political and social activism. However, what was striking in this context was the clear decline in the role of Salafi jihadism as a driving or leadership force in these uprisings. Despite the participation of some young people affiliated with Salafi movements in the field, this participation remained marginal and did not translate into a leadership or guiding role. This revealed the limitations of the Salafi jihadist project in dealing with civil and peaceful change. Salafi jihadism, with its strict ideological foundations, clashed with the nature of the Arab uprisings that erupted in 2011, known as the “Arab Spring.” These uprisings were characterized by a civil, peaceful, and pluralistic nature, raising slogans related to democracy, social justice, and human rights, and rejecting all forms of tyranny and ideological hegemony. Jihadist movements, which had long adopted a strategy of change through armed confrontation with ruling regimes, found themselves confronting a popular wave that bore no resemblance to the grassroots movements they had traditionally attracted or mobilized within. While jihadist organizations were basing their project on the dualistic ideology of “Islam and unbelief,” “loyalty and disavowal,” and limiting change to the model of armed revolution against “injustice,” the popular uprisings introduced new, unprecedented concepts into the discourse of these groups, such as the peaceful transfer of power, the legitimacy of elected institutions, political and intellectual pluralism, and broad popular participation. This led to the isolation of Salafi jihadist discourse and its lack of political effectiveness at that stage. These groups appeared to belong to a previous context, inconsistent with the historical moment that provided an opportunity for societies to express their aspirations through civil and peaceful means. The crisis of Salafi jihadism at that stage was not limited to rhetoric alone. It also encompassed its organizational structure and mobilization mechanisms, which demonstrated a clear inability to adapt to a new reality in which its rhetoric and visions were not the preferred societal choice, but rather became the object of widespread public aversion. The crowds revolting in the squares of the revolution transcended the radical propositions that had for years been fueled by feelings of oppression and exclusion. The voice of the individual citizen, with their demands for life, politics, and rights, became stronger than the voice of transnational ideology.

Thus, Salafi jihadism appeared to have fallen outside the path of the historical transformation it had been awaiting for decades. This was not only because its confrontational vision conflicted with the peaceful demands of the movement, but also because its intellectual and organizational structures were not qualified to present a convincing model for change or constructive political participation. This subsequently forced it to revise some of its concepts, or, in other cases, to exploit the security vacuums resulting from the collapse of some regimes to re-enter the scene through the gate of chaos, as occurred in Syria and Iraq.

Perhaps one of the most prominent manifestations of the structural incompetence of Salafi-jihadist movements is the fact that some of their factions gravitated toward the wave of popular movement that swept the Arab world in 2011. They lacked the tools for effective leadership or the mechanisms for deep popular influence. These factions found themselves chasing the new dynamics of the street, in a position of subservience rather than agency. This exposed their organizational fragility and strategic shortcomings. These movements were founded on the logic of jihad as the sole instrument of change, rendering them incapable of positively engaging with the nature of the peaceful movement led by non-ideological civil and youth elites. In this context, timid revisions have emerged within some jihadist circles, attempting to adapt to the new reality. Some factions, particularly in the Syrian arena, have begun to realize the importance of the post-military conquest phase—the period of managing territories, establishing civilian structures, and engaging in international relations that impose a new political logic. These groups have discovered, albeit belatedly, that the logic of jihad alone is not sufficient, and that they must possess a comprehensive vision of the concepts of statehood, good governance, resource management, foreign relations, and even the legitimacy of political representation.

This shift has been evident in some factions’ attempts to establish “local governments” or “civil administrations” to lend a sense of political legitimacy to their presence, as happened with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib, which later attempted to distance itself from terrorist designations by demonstrating its willingness to engage in the political process, despite the fundamental contradiction between its original rhetoric and these tactical revisions.

This shift not only reflects a change in tactics, but also highlights a profound crisis in the intellectual structure of Salafi jihadism, which was built on the duality of conflict and negation, not on the logic of participation and negotiation. Since their inception, these groups have remained captive to the discourse of permanent revolution, refusing to engage in any genuine political project. This has left them lacking a strategic vision for building state institutions and managing societal affairs. As the need for state tools and institutions became apparent, it became clear that these groups lacked a real vision for building an alternative system. Rather, they operated in a strategic vacuum, fueled by violence and consumed by reality. This has led to further erosion of their project and the frustration of their bases. However, the transformation that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham underwent in Idlib (as Mustafa Zahran put it) because it presented a different model, led researchers to view this group as a case that goes beyond the “open battle” viewpoint to the logic of a “possible state.” Under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, the group realized that continuing with the logic of revolution alone was not enough. Rather, it was necessary to move to the logic of the state, which is based on building institutions, managing the daily affairs of the people, providing services, maintaining security, and recognizing the realities of the complex reality.

Thus, Ahmad al-Sharaa, with his accumulated experience in jihadist activity, was able to grasp the difference between “revolutionary action,” which is based on destruction and rejection, and “political action,” which is based on construction and negotiation. This is something most other jihadist groups have failed to achieve. Al-Sharaa established the logic of the state in Idlib, working to build administrative, judicial, and security institutions and restructuring the relationship between the local community and the Islamic project espoused by the organization, making this project more viable and coexistent with the dynamic Syrian reality. The Salvation Government (the organization’s administrative arm) clearly embodied this transformation. It emerged as an attempt to structure civil action and provide services in the fields of education, the judiciary, and the economy. This represented an unprecedented development in the trajectory of Salafi jihadist groups. The organization established courts, official departments, a civil police force, and even university administrations, in a clear effort to present itself as a quasi-state alternative to chaos and collapse, and to legitimize its project both domestically and internationally. However, this shift was not unanimous within the jihadist movement. Rather, it sparked widespread controversy within traditional Salafi jihadist circles, who viewed these practices as a deviation from the authentic “jihadist approach” and accused them of falling into “political pragmatism” at the expense of principles. Many contemporary jihadist theorists view the state project, as envisioned by the organization, as a form of “systematic concession” to international and local pressures, and even a form of “normalization” with regional powers like Turkey. This has led the organization to be subject to severe criticism from jihadist movements such as the Guardians of Religion Organization and al-Qaeda. However, a careful reading of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s experience reveals that he was not merely a pragmatist seeking survival. Rather, he was a leader capable of distinguishing between the necessities of the moment and the illusions of permanent revolution, between the logic of the state and the logic of chaos. Through his experience in jihadi work and conflict with local and international forces, al-Sharaa realized that if the jihadi project is not transformed into a state project with institutional management and political control, it is doomed to erode and disappear, as happened with the Islamic State (ISIS), which exhausted itself in the logic of perpetual conflict until it collapsed from within.

The model of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (with all its problems and contradictions) represents a special case within the jihadi scene, revealing a sharp turning point in Salafi-jihadi thought: from revolution to statehood, and from abstract violence to managing reality. It is an attempt to establish a “state within a state,” even if its recognition is limited. However, it carries within it indications that some jihadi movements are gradually coming to terms with the need to deal with reality, not bypass it, and with the complexities of politics, not escape them.