Framing the New Generation of Jihadists After September 11

written by abdelfattah elhidaoui and translating by us

The jihadist movement underwent profound transformations following the events of September 11, 2001. This attack marked a turning point in the trajectory of jihadist movements, as they were subjected to a fierce attack launched by the United States and its allies under the pretext of the “war on terror.” This resulted in the killing and arrest of the majority of the historical leaders and core cadres of jihadist movements, particularly from the generation of “Arab Afghans,” as Abu Musab al-Suri noted in his book, The Call to Global Resistance (pp. 734-735). He counted the deaths of approximately (150) of the finest Arab jihadist cadres, who formed the backbone of the jihadist movement in the last quarter century of the twentieth century. This massive depletion of cadres and leaders left a vast leadership and intellectual vacuum within the jihadist movement, raising an important question about the new generation of jihadists: Where did these people derive their ideas and methodology? And how were they intellectually and organizationally framed after the collapse of the previous generation? To answer this problem, four primary sources can be identified that have contributed to shaping and crystallizing the ideas of this new generation:

1. Jihadist Forums

Jihadist forums on the Internet emerged as a primary hub for disseminating jihadist ideas, recruitment, and propaganda after September 11, and particularly after the 2003 Iraq War. These platforms provided an alternative to the traditional advocacy and organizational institutions that were targeted and dismantled. However, these forums were characterized by several negative aspects, most notably:

• The dominance of the new generation of fanatical jihadists in their administration, which led to the monopolization of jihadist discourse according to a narrow, extremist vision.

• Their use as a tool for division and internal conflict among Islamic movements, rather than a unifying platform for the nation. A clear takfiri tendency against preachers and other Islamic groups emerged.

• The spread of extremism and fanaticism, especially among Najdi Salafists, which made the forums a space repellent to any dissenting opinion.

• These forums have been infiltrated by security and intelligence agencies, and have sometimes been used as tools to gather information about jihadist activists and target them.

2. Jihadi Videos

The decline in deep ideological framing has led to the emergence of jihadist media materials as primary tools for guiding supporters and followers, particularly audio and video tapes issued by jihadist groups, most notably al-Qaeda, after 2001. These materials have been characterized by specific features:

• Their heavy focus on combative and enthusiastic military rhetoric, with a clear neglect of the intellectual and political aspects.

• A mobilization discourse brimming with emotion and talk of martyrdom and the miracles of the mujahideen, without offering a coherent strategic vision or balanced methodological education.

• The lack of in-depth educational and political content has led these materials to produce models of enthusiastic fighters rather than leadership cadres possessing a coherent vision and a balanced psyche.

3. The Platform for Tawhid and Jihad and the Influence of Al-Maqdisi’s Thought

With the rise of the Tawhid and Jihad Organization in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004, jihadist thought witnessed a clear shift toward a Salafi-jihadist orientation stemming from the Najdi Da’wa school, particularly through the significant influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s ideas. Under the supervision of al-Maqdisi and his students, the Platform for Tawhid and Jihad became the primary source for the formation of the new jihadist generation, noting the following:

• New jihadists’ intense interest in al-Maqdisi’s books and the writings of the Najdi Da’wa, with an almost complete lack of exposure to the views of dissenting figures within or outside the jihadist movement itself.

• The emergence of a fanatical and closed-minded mentality, adopting a narrow understanding of tawhid and loyalty and disavowal, while declaring dissenters apostates and despising them, and even rejecting the principle of ignorance as an excuse.

• The absence of the debate background that characterized the 1990s generation of jihadists, which has made the new generation more rigid and prone to extremism.

• As Atiyatallah al-Libi noted, there was a deliberate exaggeration of al-Maqdisi’s role as a “central theorist” of the jihadist movement, which Atiyatallah considered an exaggeration that did not accurately reflect reality.

4. The Influence of Zarqawi and the Tawhid and Jihad Group

The Tawhid and Jihad Group, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, constituted a practical and ideological axis for the new jihadists. Zarqawi, influenced by al-Maqdisi’s thought and the Najdi Da’wa, was more inclined toward extremism and fanaticism in dealing with opponents, a tendency reflected in his group, which was characterized by its harsh takfiri rhetoric and the bloodshed of its field operations. Despite the ideological and organizational differences between Zarqawi and al-Qaeda, his pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden came later, in the context of necessity and political tactics rather than a reflection of complete ideological harmony. Al-Maqdisi himself questioned in his letter “Advocacy and Advice” the significance of this pledge and its intellectual and practical dimensions.