Jihadist Salafism in Morocco: Transient Cells or Structured Organization

 Written by: abdefattah elhidaoui and translating by us

An analytical study of the intellectual and organizational structure

Talk of “Salafi Jihadism” in Morocco raises much controversy, especially given the widespread belief among some that there are established, structured Salafi Jihadist organizations similar to those in Egypt, Libya, or Algeria. However, this belief, despite its prevalence, requires scientific scrutiny to understand the nature of the jihadist phenomenon in Morocco: Are we facing a genuine organization with a clear leadership structure and a unified vision? Or is it simply a phenomenon of scattered cells influenced by external ideas, without ever maturing to the level of an independent local organization?

First: Deconstructing the Concept of “Salafi Jihadism” in the Moroccan Context

It is important to distinguish between “Salafi Jihadism” as a discourse and ideology, and “Salafi Jihadism” as an organizational expression with a central leadership and clear objectives. In the Moroccan context, this organizational dimension is almost entirely absent. The Moroccan arena has not witnessed the emergence of an independent local jihadist organization similar to that seen in other countries, such as Algeria (the Armed Islamic Group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), Egypt (the Islamic Group, the Jihad Organization), or Yemen (Ansar al-Sharia). Indeed, it can be said that the jihadist phenomenon in Morocco has not taken the form of a cohesive organization with a solid structure and clear strategic objectives. Rather, it has remained more like a phenomenon of “dispersed cells” that embrace the same ideological references but lack a unified organizational framework

A. The Lack of an Organizational Structure in Salafi Jihadism in Morocco

It can be said that Salafi Jihadism in Morocco suffers from the absence of a cohesive organizational structure that constitutes a clear structural framework that brings together the various individuals and cells that embrace this ideology. A close examination of the facts related to Salafi jihadism in Morocco, particularly through trials and judicial cases involving dozens of individuals, reveals that what are sometimes presented under the label of jihadi “organizations” are in reality only small groups or isolated cells, often linked by narrow familial or regional ties, or united by a shared enthusiasm for jihadi ideology without a comprehensive organizational project, whether at the ideological, structural, or operational levels

The names given to these cells, such as “The Straight Path Cell,” “The Ansar al-Mahdi Cell,” or “The Tunisian Cell,” do not reflect the existence of cohesive organizations with a clear collective project or unified leadership. Rather, they are circumstantial descriptions adopted either by security and judicial authorities to frame criminal cases within a specific legal framework, or within the cell itself to give a moral or symbolic character to its actions. In reality, however, they remain limited groups, most of which lack a shared vision and long-term plans

This fact also confirms that the arrests, which have included dozens of individuals in Salafi-jihadist cases, have not revealed the existence of a unified organizational structure overseeing these cells. Rather, they often involve the arrest of disparate individuals united by shared ideological convictions, limited communication via social media, or occasional encounters, without a clear hierarchy or structures responsible for institutional planning, funding, and implementation. Furthermore, the majority of court cases reveal that the leadership positions given to certain individuals within these cells are more like “circumstantial leadership,” granted simply because the individual in question is more capable of influencing or persuading within a limited group, or because he or she originally came up with the idea of ​​establishing the cell

The so-called “cell project” does not reflect a comprehensive project so much as it expresses a fleeting intention or a primitive idea that often never reaches the level of actual implementation. It often stops at the level of intentions and desires or in the initial planning stages before being dismantled by the security services. This makes describing these groups as “cells” more accurate than describing them as “organizations,” because organization, in the scientific sense, presupposes an administrative structure, internal regulations, communication mechanisms, and means of financing—all of which are clearly absent from the reality of Salafi jihadism in Morocco

Therefore, it can be said that talking about a comprehensive Moroccan jihadi organization with a unified vision and a unified leadership is scientifically and practically inaccurate. The reality indicates the presence of dispersed cells, embracing similar ideas but lacking the strong organizational ties that would make them a unified entity or a central organization with a clear project, specific literature, and interim and strategic objectives.

B. Organizational Refuge Abroad

Given the absence of a comprehensive local jihadist organization, Moroccan youth influenced by jihadist ideology had the option of engaging in international projects led by foreign organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Morocco did not develop an independent jihadist organization, as was the case in Yemen or Algeria, but rather remained a “cadre provider” for these transnational organizations

Prominent examples of this trajectory include

The involvement of Moroccans in Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), where they constituted a significant percentage of the fighters involved in armed action in the Sahel region

Large numbers of Moroccans traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight with ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, with some reports estimating their number at between 1,500 and 2,000 fighters. Most notable among them
Ibrahim Benchekroun, nicknamed “Abu Ahmed al-Muhajir.” Benchekroun is a former Guantanamo detainee who traveled to Afghanistan when he was 22 years old and joined the al-Farouq camp

The connection is based on ideology, not structure

Jihadi Salafism in Morocco was not founded on a strict organizational structure or clear frameworks, as is the case with some other jihadist experiences (such as al-Qaeda or ISIS). Rather, it emerged primarily as a movement of ideas and influences, making the intellectual factor the common link between the cells and individuals who engaged in jihadist activity in Morocco. This influence was embodied in the adoption of discourse and concepts derived from global jihadist literature, sometimes adapted to local specificities

Among the most prominent intellectual figures who influenced Moroccan jihadism are

Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb’s most famous books, which influenced the Salafi jihadist movement

1- Milestones

This is considered his most dangerous and famous book in its influence on jihadist movements
In it, he discussed the ignorance of society, the rejection of existing regimes, and the necessity of rebuilding Islamic society through a faithful vanguard
In it, he presented the idea of ​​”sovereignty” in its absolute sense, which formed the theoretical basis for the jihadists’ idea of ​​declaring rulers and societies infidels
2- In the Shade of the Qur’an (especially the later parts, following his experience in prison)

Although it is a commentary, Qutb introduced a dynamic intellectual vision into it, particularly in his interpretation of concepts such as jihad, sovereignty, and ignorance
He had a significant impact in establishing the concept of the conflict between Islam and ignorant regimes, emphasizing the necessity of change by force
3- This Religion

It focused on the comprehensiveness of Islam and the rejection of secularism. It called for the implementation of Sharia as a comprehensive way of life, a view that resonated with jihadist movements
4- Social Justice in Islam

Although this is a relatively early book and closer to a reformist approach, it focused on the concept of justice and Sharia as its sole source, which jihadist groups leveraged to criticize regimes
Summary of Influence

The Salafi jihadist movement selected from Sayyid Qutb’s thought what served its revolutionary project
Focusing on declaring regimes and societies infidels
Adopting the idea of ​​a faithful vanguard leading change
Presenting jihad as a means of change, not merely as a defensive option
Especially the book “Milestones,” which is considered a “jihadi manifesto” in the thought of jihadist movements
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: Thought and Influence on the Salafi-Jihadi Movement

First: The Intellectual Foundations of al-Maqdisi’s Thought

1. Pure Monotheism and the Concept of Loyalty and Disavowal

Al-Maqdisi believes that monotheism can only be achieved by disbelieving in the tyrant, and that anyone who rules by other than what God has revealed or resorts to man-made laws is an infidel

For him, loyalty and disavowal are fundamental principles of religion. They represent absolute loyalty to the people of monotheism and absolute disavowal of the polytheists, including governments, regimes, and constitutions.

2. Excommunication of Regimes and Governments

He believes that all contemporary Arab and Islamic regimes are apostate tyrants because they rule by other than what God has revealed and ally with “infidels,” such as America and the West

This ideology has had a profound impact on encouraging young people to embrace armed action against ruling regimes

3. Rejection of Democracy and Constitutions

He considers democracy to be blatant blasphemy because it places sovereignty in the hands of the people instead of God and governs according to other than Islamic law

He advocates for not participating in elections or parliaments, considering this to be a nullifier of Islam. 4. The Call for Global Jihad

He calls for jihad against tyrannical regimes and against what he calls the “original infidels” (such as the United States and its allies)
He distinguishes between “local jihad” (against regimes) and “global jihad,” but believes that the priority is to eliminate local tyrants
5. Purification and Education

Al-Maqdisi believes that the nation requires a period of ideological purification and intellectual education before embarking on jihad. This approach is known as “purification and education,” which sometimes leads him to criticize some jihadist movements that rush into military action
2. Al-Maqdisi’s Influence on the Salafi-Jihadist Movement

His Influence on al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq) was one of his most prominent students. He was influenced by al-Zarqawi’s adoption of takfir against regimes, but he later disagreed with him on the issue of takfir against ordinary Shiites and the expansion of targeting civilians
Al-Maqdisi sometimes criticized al-Zarqawi, but he remained an intellectual authority for jihadist movements. The Legal Basis for Armed Action

Al-Maqdisi provided the legal basis for many jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia, Jabhat al-Nusra, and even some early branches of ISIS
His ideas on monotheism, sovereignty, and jihad against regimes formed a common ideology for the jihadist movement

Differences with ISIS

Despite sharing many of the same concepts as ISIS, al-Maqdisi criticized ISIS’s extremism in declaring others apostates and permitting the shedding of Muslim blood
He rejected the declaration of the caliphate in the manner they did and criticized their approach to indiscriminate bloodshed. However, he did not back down from declaring regimes apostates and rejecting democracy

A Symbolic Figure Within the Jihadi Movement

Al-Maqdisi is considered an intellectual symbol of Salafi jihadism, and many jihadists turn to him to understand issues of loyalty and disavowal, sovereignty, and the rules of combat

Third: Conclusion

Al-Maqdisi’s thought can be summarized in three main pillars

Excommunication of regimes and rejection of man-made regimes and constitutions

The call for jihad against tyrants and the West

The importance of ideological purification before jihadi action

His intellectual influence is fundamental in shaping the orientations of the Salafi-jihadi movement. However, he was not a field commander; rather, he was the founder of the ideological discourse that fueled the various organizations

Abu Qatada al-Filistini: An influential presence in jihadi circles, particularly through his writings on the permissibility of armed operations against regimes and governments, and the legitimization of “jihadi action” as an option to confront “apostate regimes.” His most important books are:”Ma’alim al-Ta’ifa al-Mansurah”
“Jihad wa al-Ijtihad”
“Ju’nat al-Mutayyibin”
“Al-Arba’un al-Jiyyad” for the People of Monotheism and Jihad

The Impact of His Books

Abu Qatada’s books had a profound impact on

The jurisprudential legitimization of jihadi violence against ruling regimes

Criticizing moderate Islamic movements, accusing them of neglecting monotheism
Motivating immigrants to wage jihad in battlefields such as Chechnya, Iraq, and Syria
Forming the organizational and ideological awareness of groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and Salafi Jihadism in the Maghreb
Second: The Impact of Global Jihadist Discourse on the Moroccan Scene
Global jihadist discourse has had a profound impact on the intellectual structure of the jihadist movement in Morocco, although this influence has been more evident in the theoretical and symbolic realm than in the organizational and operational aspects. A number of young Moroccans have found in global jihadist literature a fertile ground for influence and inspiration, drawing their intellectual references from various schools, ranging from the writings of Sayyid Qutb, which formed the cornerstone of the ideology of “sovereignty” and “the ignorance of society,” to the propositions of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad, which crystallized the concept of the “faithful vanguard” and legitimized jihadist action as a means of regime change. The Egyptian Islamic Group, led by Omar Abdel Rahman, and the Egyptian Jihad Group can be considered the most important sources of influence for Moroccan jihadist sheikhs and Salafis

Al-Qaeda and ISIS literature have also had a notable presence in nurturing the jihadist imagination of Moroccan youth, by portraying the conflict as a universal battle between Islam and unbelief and imbuing the paths of heroism with the dimensions of these struggles. Global jihad, particularly through narratives of suffering in prisons and torture, and epic stories of battles and victories, contributed to the creation of a kind of “emotional identification” with the symbols of global jihad, without necessarily translating this into direct organizational commitment within the Moroccan arena.

This intellectual reception, which was significantly facilitated by digital media, particularly jihadist forums and websites specializing in publishing audio and visual productions of jihadist groups, led to the emergence of the “virtual jihadist” phenomenon. Many young people became involved in following the sermons of jihadist leaders such as bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, without moving beyond “passive reception” to “actual organization” or direct involvement in local networks. This is with the exception of a few limited cases influenced by external dynamics such as the wars in Syria and Iraq or cross-border recruitment networks.

The limited organizational involvement in the Moroccan context can be explained by a number of factors, including the strict security nature of the Moroccan state, which has been able to dismantle numerous jihadist cells over time. The early emergence of the Salafi-jihadist movement, the weakness of the local organizational structure capable of absorbing and guiding this large number of sympathizers, and the limited local context, in terms of the absence of an environment conducive to armed violence compared to the hotbeds of regional conflict

However, the ideological influence of global jihadist discourse remained strongly present in the rhetoric and symbolic practices of groups and individuals who adopted this ideology in Morocco, reflecting a state of “symbolic affiliation” to the global jihadist project, even in the absence of an actual organizational presence on the ground

Fourth: The Absence of Moroccan Jihadist Leadership

When examining the phenomenon of Salafi-jihadism in Morocco, the absence of what could be called a “central jihadist leadership” or a “grand jihadist authority” with a local character is evident, similar to what has been observed in other international experiences, such as those in Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, figures with an influential organizational and intellectual presence have emerged, such as Seif Allah bin Hussein (Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi), who founded Ansar al-Sharia, as well as in Egypt, such figures as al-Zawahiri, Saif al-Adl, and Rifai Taha, who are among those who have participated. They combined theory with field work within organized jihadist groups with regional and international reach

In the Moroccan case, prominent figures such as Mohamed Fizazi, Hassan Kettani, and Omar Haddouchi, despite the intellectual and social controversy they sparked during the period following the events of May 16, 2003, did not become organizational leaders in the strict sense of the word. These sheikhs were more like preachers, influenced by the local Salafi context, without a comprehensive organizational project. It has not been proven that they founded or led local jihadist organizations with clear structures and specific objectives. Rather, it can be said that, in many cases, they relied on external intellectual authorities to justify their positions or shape their opinions, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi or Abu Qatada al-Filistini. This reflects the absence of an independent Moroccan intellectual and organizational project in the jihadist arena

This absence of a central jihadist leadership in Morocco can be explained by a number of factors, including

The subordinate nature of Moroccan jihadist thought, which has remained largely tied to the writings, tapes, and fatwas of Levantine sheikhs, without the ability to produce a local theory rooted in the Moroccan context

The intense security pressures exerted by the Moroccan state, whether through preemptive arrests or close surveillance, led to the dismantling of fragile jihadist structures before they could transform into real organizations

The individualistic and isolated nature of those who adopted jihadist ideas in Morocco, where their involvement in jihadist activity often occurred through international recruitment networks or by joining foreign conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria, without a cohesive local organization to frame these groups or unify their efforts

The lack of field experience compared to their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia, or Algeria, who had extensive armed experiences in their own countries. It is noteworthy that even within prisons, figures like Fizazi or Kettani did not transform into “jihadi icons” with strict guiding authority over jihadi detainees, as was the case with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Jordan or Abdelkrim Belhaj in Libya, where they served as intellectual and leadership references for prisoners and detainees. Indeed, some of these sheikhs in Morocco, such as Fizazi, later demonstrated a marked shift in their positions, even abandoning jihadi ideology and embracing reform and moderation. This deepened the gap between jihadi Salafism in Morocco and the existence of a central leadership that unifies its ranks

In general, it can be said that the Moroccan jihadi scene has remained fragmented, lacking a unified leadership and a coherent organizational project. This has contributed to the jihadi phenomenon in Morocco remaining more like isolated cells or individual cases than an organized phenomenon with a clear institutional reach, similar to what has been the case in other experiences in the region

Fifth: The State’s Ease of Dismantling These Cells

The ease with which these Salafi-jihadist cells in Morocco were dismantled was not a coincidence, but rather a natural result of several complex factors. On the one hand, the Moroccan state was well aware that Moroccan Salafi-jihadism did not stem from a purely local context, but rather was an imported phenomenon, heavily influenced by the general wave shaped by al-Qaeda at the beginning of the third millennium. Most members of these cells adopted al-Qaeda’s rhetoric, including jihadist theory, the classifications of the “near enemy” and “far enemy,” the rhetoric of the “reluctant sect,” the “rule of apostasy,” and other concepts entrenched in al-Qaeda’s rhetoric

However, this intellectual state was unstable. It quickly underwent profound transformations with the emergence of ISIS, which reshuffled priorities and loyalties inside and outside Moroccan prisons. The ranks were divided between those who remained loyal to al-Qaeda and those who were fascinated by the “Islamic State” project, leading to fragmented loyalties and the organizational and ideological disintegration of the Salafi-jihadi front. This division created chaos within prisons, as the leaders and sheikhs of the Salafi-jihadi movement in Morocco were unable to frame this fragmented landscape. Indeed, many of them lost control of their bases and failed to present a unified vision or unifying discourse that would control the divergent orientations

The absence of a true central authority, as is the case with some Salafi-jihadi experiences in the Arab world, rendered these cells in Morocco more like isolated groups, devoid of a cohesive intellectual or organizational leadership. There was no hierarchical organization or strict organizational structure that could pose a real security threat to the state; rather, they were small cells with limited capabilities, most of which were driven by individual or emotional motivations rather than being part of an organized jihadi project within Morocco

Herein lies the Moroccan state’s greatest strength: through its security and intelligence services, it was able to monitor these fragile trends and identify the weaknesses in the structure of Moroccan Salafi jihadism, both in terms of a lack of funding and logistical support, and in terms of weak ideological and organizational framework. This was facilitated by the fact that most of those belonging to these cells did not have a military plan within Morocco; rather, their goal was generally limited to joining conflict zones abroad (Iraq, Syria, Mali, etc.), or they limited themselves to adopting a general jihadist discourse without actually planning any internal operations. Therefore, it was easy for the state to contain them and dismantle their cells, often without significant resistance or security complications

Even after their arrest, these individuals did not pose a serious threat within prisons, as their daily lives were normal, and they were unable to create a confrontational environment or a state of rebellion within the prison institutions. Moreover, their preaching and jihadist figures were unable to frame the new detainees or build a solid intellectual framework that would reproduce the jihadist discourse within prisons. This further fragmented the situation and emptied it of its revolutionary content

This picture clearly reflects that Salafi jihadism in Morocco was never able to transform into a solid organization capable of survival or the ability to impose a reality on the ground, as happened in some Arab experiences. Rather, it remained a fragmented entity, easily dismantled and controlled, a task the Moroccan state effectively achieved through a proactive security approach, as well as by controlling the preaching and intellectual sphere inside and outside prisons

It can be said that talking about a Moroccan Salafi jihadist organization is akin to talking about a “false birth certificate.” Salafi jihadism in Morocco did not develop into an organization, but rather remained a collection of scattered cells and groups influenced by global ideas. The absence of local leadership, the reliance on foreign ideas and projects, and the weakness of the organizational structure are all factors that have made Salafi jihadism in Morocco a marginal phenomenon that can be easily dismantled, without transforming into a cohesive entity as is the case in some other countries