“Stealing Al Qaeda’s Plan Book”: A Reading of the US Counterterrorism Center Report (2006)

The 2006 report “Stealing Al-Qaida’s Playbook,” published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, is one of the most important documents addressing the phenomenon of contemporary jihadist movements and strategies for dealing with them. The report, prepared by Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, represents an analytical intelligence document that clearly reflects American strategic thinking in dealing with jihadist groups after the events of September 11, 2001. Despite the report’s importance and gravity, it has not received sufficient attention in Arab academic and research circles, making it a document worthy of study and analysis to understand Western approaches to combating jihadist movements

The report aims to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of jihadist movements, with a focus on the need to exploit what it calls the “jihadi gap,” represented by the online dissemination of jihadist leaders’ plans, strategies, and literature. The report’s authors believe that these published materials represent an “open plan book” that the United States can exploit to understand the nature of jihadist groups and their mechanisms of operation. The report’s methodology relies on an analysis of the literature of four of the most prominent jihadist theorists, who are considered primary sources for understanding jihadist thought:

• Abu Bakr Naji (author of The Management of Savagery)

• Ayman al-Zawahiri (in his book Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace)

• Abu Qatada al-Filistini (in his articles Between Two Methodologies)

• Abu Musab al-Suri (in his book The Syrian Experience)

The report highlights that analyzing these texts reveals internal contradictions and disagreements among jihadist movements, providing an entry point for understanding the dynamics of internal conflict and deconstructing these movements

The report reached a set of strategic conclusions that formed the basis for US policies in dealing with jihadist movements in subsequent years, most notably:

1. The importance of proxy wars: The report recommended avoiding direct military intervention in Middle Eastern countries and instead relying on proxy wars, whether through ruling regimes or tribal and sectarian components. This was clearly demonstrated by the experience of the “Sahwat” in Iraq after 2007.

2. The strategy of distorting the jihadist image: The report emphasized the need to work to distort the image of jihadist groups in the eyes of Arab and Islamic public opinion by highlighting their violent practices against civilians (as in the case of the murder of the child Shaima in Egypt), while utilizing the tools of media warfare previously used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

3. The use of local actors: The report called for capitalizing on the influence of non-jihadist Islamic figures and groups to counter jihadist ideology, such as the Salafi preacher Rabi’ al-Madkhali in Saudi Arabia, while emphasizing the need for careful investigation and limiting the scope of support for these figures to avoid counterproductive results. The report also recommended employing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Shiites in Saudi Arabia, depending on the specificities of each country, while ensuring that the American role remains in the background without direct exposure.

4. Redefining Islam and Democracy: The report recommended re-exporting new concepts of Islam and democracy to Arab peoples, as part of an effort to separate Muslim youth from jihadist ideology.

5. Establishing Specialized Research Centers: The report emphasized the importance of establishing research centers tasked with continuously analyzing jihadist literature. It noted that the results of these studies may not be immediately apparent, but they will have a significant impact with the change of governments and the rise of new regimes in the future. The report considered this a long-term strategic investment

The importance of this report lies in its revelation of the profound American perspective on jihadist movements and its explanation of many of the policies the United States subsequently pursued in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The report also demonstrates that the confrontation was not limited to the security or military dimension, but extended to a war of ideas, by exploiting the intellectual gaps within jihadist movements and dismantling their discourse from within.

The report also emphasizes the centrality of the media and psychological dimensions in confronting jihadist movements, and the necessity of “image management,” so that these groups appear as brutal and merciless forces, facilitating their isolation from the popular base that constitutes their primary source of strength.

The report, “Stealing Al-Qaeda’s Plan Notebook,” represents a pivotal strategic document in understanding the American approach to the jihadist phenomenon. It combines intellectual and intelligence analysis and offers practical recommendations that have had a clear impact on Western policies toward armed Islamist movements. The report also reflects a long-term vision that views confronting jihadist ideology as a long-term project that cannot be resolved solely with weapons, but rather through reengineering the intellectual and social structures that feed this ideology. In the absence of an official Arabic translation of this report, there remains an urgent need to directly access the original text and to further study it, particularly in the context of examining the evolution of jihadist discourse and its interaction with external pressures, to understand the dynamics of the conflict and its future outcomes