The Enemy’s Jurisprudence in Contemporary Salafi Thought: A Study of Salafi Positions on the Iranian-Israeli Conflict

 Written by abdelfattah elhidaoui and translating by us

The Iranian-Israeli conflict is one of the most complex geopolitical issues in the Middle East, a conflict in which ideological, political, and historical dimensions intertwine. This conflict has posed a major challenge to Islamic movements in general, and Salafism in particular, given the centrality of the concepts of loyalty and disavowal (al-wala’ wa-l-bara’) and the jurisprudence of the enemy (fiqh al-‘adiyah) within their intellectual structure

Salafi positions on this conflict are divided between those who view Iran as the greatest threat to Sunnis, those who consider Israel the primary enemy, and those who remain neutral, claiming that both sides are enemies of the Islamic nation. This study aims to analyze these divergent positions and understand the intellectual and political foundations upon which they are based, while taking into account the historical context of the geopolitical transformations that the Islamic world has experienced since the Iranian Revolution until the Iranian attack on Israel

The problem: How is the concept of “the enemy” shaped in contemporary Salafi thought? What are the ideological and political foundations that determine the priorities of the hostility between Shiite Iran and Zionist Israel ?l

In light of the sharp escalation in the Iran-Israel conflict, especially after the Iranian attack in 2025, a crisis of position emerged within the Salafi movement as a result of the complexity of the political and ideological landscape. This new context posed challenges in determining a clear legal and political position on the conflict. The escalating hostility between Iran and Israel raised a central question: who is the real enemy that must be confronted? Should the priority in the battle be with the ideological enemy (Shiite Iran) or with the existential enemy (occupied Israel.?.)

Chapter One: The Jurisprudence of the Enemy in Salafi Thought

Definition of Salafism and Its Types
Salafism is a Sunni Islamic religious movement based on adherence to the methodology of the righteous predecessors, i.e., the Companions, their Successors, and the Successors of their Successors. This methodology is based on adherence to legal texts as understood by the early Muslims, prioritizing belief over politics, emphasizing monotheism, and achieving loyalty and disavowal. Contemporary Salafism is divided into several trends

Traditional Scientific Salafism: Focuses on education, belief, and obedience
Madkhali (Jami’i) Salafism: Subordinate to the political authority and attacks Islamist movements
Jihadi Salafism: Believes in armed jihad against regimes and external enemies
Activist Salafism (Sahawiyya): Combines preaching with political reform
The Principle of Loyalty and Disavowal as a Basis for Defining Enmities
The principle of loyalty and disavowal is a central tenet of the doctrinal structure of Salafi thought in general. It is based on loyalty and support for believers and disavowal of disbelievers, innovators, and polytheists. This principle is based on numerous Quranic verses, most notably the verse: “You will not find a people who believe in Allah and the Last Day having friendship with those who oppose Allah and His Messenger…” [Al-Mujadila: 22], and the verse: “And whoever among you takes them as allies, then indeed he is of them…” [Al-Ma’idah: 51]

Based on this perception, the enemy is not defined according to political or geographical considerations, but rather primarily according to doctrinal affiliation. The criterion is not the position on Palestine or the occupation, but rather the degree of doctrinal agreement or conflict. Here, the Shiites emerge in many Salafi perceptions as the “most dangerous internal enemy,” viewed as “those who innovate vehemently” or even an “apostate sect,” according to some. This is due to what they see as Shiites’ attacks on the Companions and the Mothers of the Believers, their position on the oneness of divinity and Lordship, and their innovations in worship and doctrine

This foundational framework has made the position toward Iran, as the “greatest sponsor of Shiism,” more complex than the position toward Israel, and sometimes even more unacceptable. Iran is viewed not only as a “resistance” state, but also as an “ideological adversary” eroding the body of the nation from within, penetrating through religious sectarianism and political extensions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The impact of this perception is evident in the speeches of a number of Salafi jihadist sheikhs, who have viewed “the Rafidis as more dangerous than Jews and Christians.” Some have even considered Iran a “strategic ideological enemy” with which coexistence is impossible

This ideological perception has had a direct impact in fueling the Sunni-Shiite conflict in more than one arena, especially in Iraq after 2003, where the discourse of jihad against the “neo-Safavids” has prevailed. It has also been seen in Afghanistan, where tensions have repeatedly erupted between Salafi jihadist groups and Shiite movements

This doctrinal perspective creates a dilemma in realistic political engagement. It does not permit any rapprochement with the Shiites, even in cases of shared interests, such as confronting the occupation or supporting the Palestinian cause. This is because, from a doctrinal perspective, this constitutes a form of forbidden allegiance. In this sense, the discourse of loyalty and disavowal not only defines the enemy, but also defines the boundaries of alliances and enmities, preventing any rapprochement with the Shiite side, even if it intersects with it on some interests. This concept constitutes one of the most important reasons for the Salafis’ obstinacy regarding the project of “Islamic unity” or “comprehensive resistance.”

The Jurisprudence of Balances and Its Impact on Prioritization
The jurisprudence of balances constitutes one of the most important jurisprudential tools used by Islamist movements in their approaches to complex political realities. This jurisprudence is based on a set of fundamentalist, objective principles. However, the traditional Salafi movement has remained cautious regarding this jurisprudence, viewing it as an entry point for dissolving doctrinal boundaries

With the shifts in geopolitical reality, particularly after the occupation of Iraq (2003), the rise of Iranian influence, and the subsequent repeated Israeli aggression, some Salafi-jihadi movements began to reconsider the strictness of their doctrinal classification. Attempts emerged to employ the jurisprudence of balances to justify circumstantial rapprochement with resistance movements with “deviant” doctrinal backgrounds, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, or even the Iranian state itself. These attempts were based on the assumption that the threat of the Zionist occupation was a direct existential threat, while the dispute with the Shiites could be postponed or contained. Thus, a kind of “doctrinal pragmatism” emerged within Salafi-jihadi movements, where this rapprochement was justified on the basis of a convergence of interests, not a false allegiance

These shifts pose a complex intellectual and jurisprudential problem, related to the extent to which the Salafi movement can produce realistic political jurisprudence without compromising its doctrinal principles. Although some Salafi-jihadi theorists have attempted to establish the jurisprudence of balancing within a jihadi context, this jurisprudence has remained confined to the combat mobilization framework and has not evolved into a well-established school of ijtihad

Different Positions Within the Salafi Movement
In contrast, the Madkhali Salafi movement has rejected this type of ijtihad, considering any alliance with Iran or support for Shiite resistance movements a betrayal of the faith. Thus, the Salafi movement has been divided in its approach to the Iranian-Israeli conflict into two main currents

A realistic jihadi movement: employs the jurisprudence of balancing to justify support for the resistance against Israel, even if it is supported by Iran, while maintaining a negative doctrinal position on Shiism
A purely ideological movement (Madkhali/Jami’i): rejects any rapprochement with Iran or its allies and views the Shiite threat as more dangerous than the Israeli occupation, based on the principle that “the ideological enemy deserves a break.”
The problem of employing the jurisprudence of balances in Salafi thought reveals an internal conflict between the requirements of faith and the requirements of real politics, a conflict that has not yet been resolved

Chapter Two: The Salafi Position on Iran and Israel

Iran as an Ideological and Political Enemy
Salafis generally view Iran from an ideological perspective, considering it a Shiite state whose ideology—from their perspective—is based on blatant heresies, including the claim that the Companions were corrupted, the claim that the Quran was distorted, and exaggeration in the veneration of the Imams. In Salafi discourse, Shiites are referred to as “Rafidis” or “People of Misguidance,” and they are considered one of the most dangerous sects threatening Muslim faith. Salafi literature is rife with fatwas declaring Shiites to be infidels or warning them against them, making hostility toward Iran deeply religious

In addition to the ideological dimension, political hostility toward Iran is reinforced by its regional interventions in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. The Salafi movement believes that Iran seeks to export its revolution and establish a sectarian axis directed against Sunnis, relying on militias such as the Popular Mobilization Forces, the Houthis, and Hezbollah. This reality has deepened the Salafis’ conviction that Iran poses not only a sectarian threat, but also a geopolitical threat that threatens the very existence of the Sunni world

The Doctrinal View of Israel
In the Salafi ideological view, Israel is an entity that usurps Muslim land, occupies Jerusalem, and attacks Al-Aqsa Mosque. In this context, Quranic verses are invoked, such as the verse: “You will surely find the most intense of the people in animosity toward the believers to be the Jews…” [Al-Ma’idah: 82]. Jews are treated—particularly in the literature of the traditional Salafi and jihadi movements—as both ideological and political enemies, given their connection to Israel and their historical adversaries of Muslims

However, despite the centrality of the Palestinian issue in general Islamic discourse, the ideological hostility toward Israel in some Salafi circles does not reach the level of hostility toward Iran. This is due to these movements’ belief that Shiism is a doctrinal deviation more dangerous than political occupation. The reason for this is that doctrinal deviation, from a Salafi perspective, corrupts monotheism and threatens faith, and is more deserving of hostility than political deviation

The Salafi Jihadist Position on Hamas
Despite Salafi Jihadism’s agreement with Hamas on the goal of fighting Israel, it has not supported it for several reasons

Methodological and doctrinal differences: Salafi Jihadism views Hamas as a Muslim Brotherhood movement, a movement it considers “dilutive” in its doctrine and lax in its commitment to unified governance. Hamas is also accused of embracing a nationalist project rather than a purely Islamic one

Its Relationship with Iran and Hezbollah: Despite Hamas’s Sunni character, its relationship with Iran and Hezbollah has irked Salafi jihadists. This alliance is viewed as a surrender of ideological loyalty in exchange for military or logistical gains, and constitutes “collusion with the Rafidis.”
Organizational specificity: Salafi jihadism views jihad as an international project that should not be monopolized by “local movements with political objectives.”

Positions on Normalization
With the wave of normalization agreements that began in 2020, a significant discrepancy emerged among Salafi movements

Madkhali Salafism: remained silent or justified normalization based on “obedience to the ruler” and “the jurisprudence of balances.”
Jihadi and Traditional Salafism: denounced normalization as a betrayal of the nation, viewing it as a manifestation of allegiance to infidels and a threat to faith and identity
Comparing the Doctrinal Position on Iran and the Palestinian Movements Cooperating with It
From the Salafi Jihadi perspective, Iran is considered a Rafidi state and is accused of exploiting the Palestinian cause to infiltrate the Sunni world. Any Palestinian faction that cooperates with Iran is subject to doctrinal suspicion, even if it is fighting Israel. Therefore, there is a noticeable presence of jihadi discourses that consider Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran more dangerous than Israel, claiming that their threat is “internal and ideological,” not merely an “external political occupation.”

Conclusion and Questions Regarding the Salafi Movement

The Salafi position on Israel and Iran reveals a complex structure based on a strict doctrinal conception that makes loyalty and disavowal a fundamental criterion for classifying friend and enemy. For some Salafis, the “Shiite enemy” may be more dangerous than the “Zionist enemy,” which explains why Salafi jihadism has not directly supported Hamas and why some Salafi factions have distanced themselves from resistance alliances, despite their shared hostility to Israel

Salafi movements are witnessing a clear division in their stance on the Iranian-Israeli conflict, especially after the escalation of tensions and the Iranian attack in April 2025. Salafi jihadism believes that the conflict serves the interests of Muslims by weakening both enemies, while Madkhali Salafism adopts positions that criticize Iran and hold it responsible for the conflicts. Traditional Salafism adheres to neutrality or caution. These divisions reflect a moral and political dilemma in how to deal with the two enemies, with a clear failure to employ the jurisprudence of balance to find compromises. Finally, it appears that the Salafi movement has not produced a unified position on the conflict, which calls for a reconsideration of the concept of “enemy jurisprudence” within Salafi thought

In light of the acute tensions witnessed in the Iranian-Israeli conflict and the intensification of confrontation in the region, it is clear that the Salafi movement has not yet been able to formulate a unified and disciplined position that reflects its deep understanding of political doctrine and the necessity of balancing principles and interests. This movement has remained trapped between its ideological alliances, which define who is the legitimate “enemy,” and its political priorities, which are often unable to confront contemporary geopolitical challenges with realism and flexibility

Hence, the urgent need to rethink “enemy jurisprudence” within Salafi thought emerges, not only as a purely doctrinal issue, but also as a scientific and strategic necessity that allows for a careful balance between legitimate and realistic interests in light of the complexities of the current reality

Perhaps it would be useful for the Salafi movement to pose a series of profound questions that go beyond traditional discourse, inspired by the jurisprudence of reality and the blessed Prophetic biography

From the jurisprudence of reality
How can the Salafi movement deal with the reality of complex and intertwined conflicts, which are not subject to the logic of a simple binary conflict between “Muslim and infidel”?
Can the classification of the “enemy” be reconsidered to allow for temporary strategic alliances that protect the interests of the nation and break the cycle of sectarian and denominational conflicts?
In light of direct Israeli threats against some Islamic countries, how can we explain the refusal to defend any Muslim party, regardless of our differences in doctrine or politics?
From the jurisprudence of the Prophet’s biography
What was the position of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his companions regarding political and military alliances with non-Muslims in confronting the enemies of the nation? Was their position always categorical or flexible according to their interests and interests?
How can we draw inspiration from the lessons of the Prophet’s biography in dealing with the “enemy” in a way that achieves the higher objectives of Islamic law: preserving religion, life, honor, wealth, and the mind?
These questions are not a call to abandon principles, but rather an attempt to critically re-read them objectively, balancing constants and variables, and establishing a new, renewed jurisprudence capable of dealing with contemporary political realities with scientific and spiritual responsibility

Will the Salafi movement be able to undertake this experience, or will it remain captive to its stereotypical positions, which may hinder its ability to confront the major challenges threatening the nationtoday?….y