Twelve Days War

writen by abdelkebir belafsahi and translating by us

The twelve-day war, if we can call it that, between Iran and the Zionist entity may truly be the beginning of the end for Israel as we know it. US President Donald Trump’s declaration of the “end of the war” was merely the culmination of a larger conflict, dubbed the “War of the Great Deception.” This war was not intended to achieve a decisive military victory, but rather served as a tool to reproduce the narratives of internal legitimacy in both Iran and Israel. In other words, the goal was not to settle historical scores or resolve a traditional conflict, but rather to exploit the military moment to consolidate the legitimacy of the political regimes internally. The way the war ended seemed designed to save face for all parties. No one was clearly defeated, no one declared surrender, and each side crafted its own narrative of victory and celebrated it according to its own logic and internal motivations, even if those narratives contradicted reality or were shrouded in doubt amid deception and illusory victories. One of the most prominent features of this war is the vast discrepancy in narratives and information. Israel, for example, announced the assassination of a number of prominent Iranian military leaders, but these leaders later appeared at victory celebrations in Tehran or at official meetings, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) defense ministers’ meeting in China, where the Iranian Defense Minister and Supreme Leader’s advisor, Ali Shamkhani, who were both rumored to have been assassinated, appeared alive at public events. Regarding the Iranian nuclear program, the United States and Israel claimed it had been completely destroyed, while Iran categorically denied this. European intelligence reports even confirmed that Iran’s uranium stockpile had not been affected. This led to a famous scene when Trump became agitated and demanded the expulsion of a CNN correspondent for simply announcing the news, even hurling insults at her. The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, tried to portray the war as a domestic political gain, but strategically, on the military and security levels, he suffered huge symbolic losses. For the first time since 1948, Tel Aviv was targeted in such a violent manner, in its heart and depths, despite the presence of the “Iron Dome,” which has always been described as an impenetrable shield. The collapse of this illusion alone represents a major moral defeat for Israel, because this war was not a conventional war as much as it was a battle of narratives and media and political deception, in which there was no real victor. Rather, each side sought to paint an image of an imaginary victory that would serve its domestic goals. Indeed, it is a war that has ended, but its effects will remain present in the form of a mutual legitimacy crisis and the fragility of the image of each of the two regimes before their audiences

The conflict between Iran and Israel can also be viewed not only as a traditional enmity or historical rivalry, but as an existential necessity used by both sides to consolidate the legitimacy of the political regime internally. Since 1979, the “Zionist enemy” has become a fundamental part of Iranian political and media discourse, and is used as a tool to test and maintain the legitimacy of successive regimes. This is because the Iranian Revolution of 1979 represents the cornerstone in shaping Iran’s political identity, and the continuation of this hostile discourse strengthens the regime’s cohesion internally. As for Israel, it presents Iran as an existential threat that threatens not only Israel’s security, but also the security of the region and the world as a whole. It is used as a scarecrow to justify many military and security policies. Through this escalation, Benjamin Netanyahu has succeeded in achieving three main goals: ensuring the continued militarization of the state. The conflict has provided a convincing justification for continuing to strengthen military capabilities and increase defense budgets, under the pretext of confronting the Iranian threat, and maintaining Western support, especially American support. Despite the decline in European sympathy for Israel as a result of its war on Gaza, Netanyahu has been able, by focusing on the Iranian threat, to redirect attention and maintain some of this support. Support, and ultimately, domestic political gains, as he used the escalation with Iran as a tool to reshape the relationship between state and society. Netanyahu, who was facing a deep political crisis and a failure to achieve the goals of the war on Gaza, in addition to legal prosecutions and the possibility of his government’s downfall, saw in the Iranian strike an opportunity to rally the public around him. As soon as the strike occurred, the political forces united behind him, including the opposition, which again declared their support for him. Indeed, opinion polls began to favor him, and he even considered calling for early elections. In contrast, Iran has been experiencing a wave of widespread domestic protests since 2022. These protests began with the killing of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the police and escalated days before the military strike, with 93 cities across 27 Iranian provinces witnessing widespread protests over economic and living conditions. However, immediately after the attack, the Iranian street united behind the regime, and even the domestic opposition halted its criticism. An example of this is the statement made by the Iranian writer and professor of political sociology, Bayat, who emphasized that it is impossible to stand against the Iranian state in these circumstances. One of the most prominent symbols of this unity was Sahar Emami, the Iranian broadcaster who was killed in the bombing of the Iranian television building during a live broadcast. Her image has now become a symbol of steadfastness and resistance, with her image filling the streets and squares of Tehran. Therefore, this war was not fought with the goal of achieving a decisive military victory, but rather as a means of managing internal crises on both sides. The conflict has transcended traditional military dimensions, becoming a tool for reshaping the relationship between state and society and establishing the legitimacy of the ruling regimes amid worsening internal crises. Although the declared Israeli goal of the recent strike on Iran was twofold: to topple the Iranian regime and end the nuclear program, neither of these goals was actually achieved. The regime did not fall or end the nuclear program. On the contrary, the legitimacy of the regime was strengthened internally, and the Iranians united behind their government in a scene that reflects how external aggression can become fuel that unites internally rather than disintegrates it. This is in contrast to Israel, and specifically the government of Benjamin Netanyahu, which sought through this strike to achieve internal political gains, in light of successive crises plaguing the government, from the failure in Gaza, to the rise of international criticism, to the decline in his popularity and divisions in the Knesset. Netanyahu saw the strike on Iran as an opportunity to escape his political predicament

Since the 1990s, Iran has been at the core of Netanyahu’s political and intellectual project. In his first book, “A Place Under the Sun,” published in 1993, and later in his second book, published in 1997, Netanyahu relentlessly portrayed Iran as an existential threat not only to Israel but to Western interests as a whole, emphasizing that Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe for the region and the world. He later used this same rhetoric to persuade the United States to engage in a direct confrontation with Tehran, which resulted in the recent American strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The question here is: Did Netanyahu implicate the United States in this confrontation? Or was Washington planning it in advance? The answer remains complex, as the US administration only initiated the strike after a violent Iranian response, which targeted Israeli territory with missiles for the first time since the founding of Israel in 1948. These strikes were shocking and unexpected, prompting the US president to clearly state that the American intervention “saved Israel.” Indeed, the Iranian strike that struck the heart of Israel disrupted military and political calculations, nearly turning Netanyahu’s limited gains into strategic losses. However, based on the logic of “escape forward,” Netanyahu attempted to capitalize on the moment to present himself as a decisive leader capable of confronting Israel’s greatest adversaries, even though his ultimate goals were not achieved. Israel’s ambition to eliminate the Iranian nuclear program and topple the regime is not new, but has always been fueled by the fragility of the internal situation in Iran, including social and economic protests and the decline of Iranians’ confidence in their regime. Nevertheless, the strike had completely opposite results. The Iranian regime succeeded in exploiting the external escalation to unify the internal front, even attracting some opponents to the state’s trenches. Despite the ongoing protests since 2022 following the killing of Mahsa Amini, the Iranian street has demonstrated an astonishing ability to unite in times of danger. The Persian-majority population possesses a distinct national identity and pride, making any external attack a reason to rally around the regime rather than undermine it. The Iranian opposition is neither homogeneous nor unified. Abroad, the scene is dominated by organizations such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), led by Maryam Rajavi, and the monarchist movement allied with the Shah’s son, as well as separatist groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Party. However, these forces, although they adopt a discourse of overthrowing the regime, lack real popular support inside Iran. They also reject the idea of regime change through external intervention, which weakens their effectiveness even in moments of crisis. In contrast, and internally, the opposition is more fragmented, divided among unorganized student and human rights movements that lack effective tools for change, even if they express a popular mood of discontent that appears in the form of scattered waves of protests. Therefore, betting on the fall of the Iranian regime through external strikes was and remains an unrealistic bet, as this round of escalation has proven. In the end, this confrontation shows that politics in the Middle East is no longer measured solely by the balance of military power, but by the ability of regimes to employ conflict externally to strengthen their positions internally. Netanyahu did not achieve the goals he announced, but may have found himself in a position Defensive after the Iranian response, Tehran used the strike as a tool to restore internal cohesion, despite all the rifts. The most important question remains: Was this internal Iranian alignment temporary? And will things return to the way they were after the war ends? The answer will not be long in coming, but it is clear that toppling the Iranian regime, as Israel promotes, will not be possible through aircraft and missiles. Rather, it requires something deeper: social and political transformations from within, not brought about by bombardment

As previously mentioned, despite the concentrated Israeli strikes targeting the Iranian interior and the precise assassinations targeting “big heads” in the Iranian leadership, Israel has proven once again that it is incapable of overthrowing the Iranian regime. It has not abandoned this idea despite its repeated failures. This is all due to the fact that Iran’s geography, which extends over an area three times the size of Iraq, and its complex demographics, characterized by ethnic and religious diversity, render the idea of overthrowing the Iranian regime through airstrikes or limited intelligence operations a mere strategic illusion. This is because Iran is not like Gaza, nor is it similar to Lebanon or Syria in terms of its land size, the nature of its government, the composition of its regime, or the size of its popular base. The Israeli bet, while seemingly bold on the surface, amounted to little more than an attempt to exploit its technical and intelligence capabilities to penetrate Iran’s defense system and create internal pressure through psychological warfare and social media platforms, even offering medical consultations to the wounded inside Iran. However, these tools, no matter how precise, are insufficient to bring down a regime of this magnitude. In reality, toppling the Iranian regime requires a comprehensive, complex, multilateral war and a broad international coalition led by the United States, as occurred in Iraq in 2003 against Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, the Iranian context is entirely different in terms of its political structure, military power, and regional and international alliances. Therefore, despite the media and political hype, Israel has not achieved its strategic goals. Although Netanyahu is attempting to offer “symbolic gains” within Israel to cover up this failure, especially in light of his ongoing failures in Gaza, recent Israeli opinion polls have confirmed that the war in Gaza has become more of a burden than a gain, and that the time has come to seek a political settlement or truce. This undermines a large part of the narrative Netanyahu is trying to establish around Israeli “victories.” Therefore, the American strike is intended to save Israel or Netanyahu and save face. On the other hand, this scene cannot be read without addressing the American position. The current US administration, led by Donald Trump, has attempted to present itself as the sole power capable of managing the balance in the Middle East by striking Iran and then calling for calm and negotiations. It sought to clearly state, “We hold the keys to both war and peace.” However, the powerful Iranian strikes, which struck deep within Israel, revealed the limits of the Israeli role and confirmed to Washington that Israel alone is no longer capable of playing the role of “permanent deterrence” in the region. Trump’s statement that he intervened “to save Israel” reflects this reality. However, in essence, the intent was not to save the country as much as it was to save Netanyahu personally from political collapse. Perhaps most clearly, Trump asked the Israeli president to grant Netanyahu a pardon, considering him a “national hero” deserving of honor, not prosecution. This position appeared to be a direct interference in the judicial affairs of a democratic state, and sparked widespread resentment within Israeli circles, even from the opposition, which considered it an insult to the rule of law and independent institutions. Despite Netanyahu’s attempts to exploit the relationship with Trump politically, the Israeli judiciary rejected his request to postpone the trial and confirmed that his trial sessions would proceed as scheduled during the current month. Here, the great contradiction between the two scenes is revealed, because there is a leader trying to portray himself as a national hero, while he stands before the judiciary on serious corruption charges. This contradicts and transforms from tools of deterrence to tools of policy. The most important question that arises in light of this escalation is: Have Israeli strikes become a tool of American policy to impose “peace by force”? According to the Trump administration’s approach, it seems that the answer is yes, because the United States seeks to impose a political reality in the Middle East that serves its interests first and foremost, as it considers Israel one of its executive tools to achieve this reality, while Iran, in contrast, plays the role of a stubborn opponent. In this equation, with Russian and Chinese support, and tactical partnerships with multiple regional powers

Israel is once again relapsing into a state of internal crisis, as a result of the complexities of the political and military landscape, most notably the ongoing aggression against Gaza. This deeply rooted crisis within Israel has not been resolved; rather, it has deepened, especially in the absence of any decisive solution or clear strategic outcomes. Therefore, with the increasing pressure from mediators, both Egyptian and Qatari, it appears that an agreement will eventually be imposed, and Netanyahu will find himself compelled to agree to it in an attempt to end this situation. Even if it is not an official recognition by all parties, it will be an implicit admission that no one has achieved complete victory, because everyone has lost and everyone claims victory. A realistic view of the conflict reveals that no one has emerged as a clear victor. The Iranian nuclear program has not been destroyed, as the United States claimed. The Iranian regime has not fallen, and Iran’s “proxies” in the region have not been eliminated, as planned from the outset of the operations. Furthermore, Palestinian factions continue to carry out painful strikes against Israeli forces in Gaza and continue to pose a real military threat. Meanwhile, Iran’s other proxies, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, remain outside the scope of effective engagement, despite expectations of their intervention. This is because, despite all the strikes, Iran entered this confrontation as if without apparent support from its traditional allies. Neither Russia, China, nor Hezbollah intervened directly, revealing the extent of American pressure and Washington’s role in neutralizing these forces in favor of strengthening Israel’s position on the ground. What is strange is that none of these proxies, which Iran has spent years building, have acted at this critical moment. Even Hezbollah, which is geographically closest to Israel, has remained silent, despite some escalatory rhetoric. Although the operation’s major objectives were not achieved, some believe that Israel succeeded in neutralizing “non-state armed actors,” or what is known as the “support and resistance axis,” particularly in the Red Sea. The Houthis’ failure to seriously influence shipping in that sensitive region represents an implicit gain for Tel Aviv, which seeks to secure the sea lanes, which are a vital economic artery for the Middle East.

On the Iranian side, Tehran demonstrated its ability to absorb and even respond to the opening blow, which contributed to stabilizing the internal front and restoring the cohesion of the political system. Following that blow, Washington and Tel Aviv resorted to what is known as the “strategic deception” theory, misleading observers with conflicting announcements about the existence of escalation plans or a possible truce. This kept the scene shrouded in mystery. The important question remains: Will Iran respond by adopting the same strategy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear program?

Western reports confirm that Iran’s nuclear program has not been affected, and that enrichment facilities are still operating efficiently. Indeed, satellite activity detected significant activity before and after the strike, which may indicate preemptive Iranian preparations. After the strike, the Iranian foreign minister confirmed that the nuclear program had not been hit, but was still operating at full capacity. He even repeated the same statement days later, raising several questions: Does Tehran want to reassure its domestic audience that it remains strong? Or is it concealing real damage to protect its negotiating position? It is likely that Iran, as it has done over the years, is adept at using the “nuclear card” as a tool for deterrence and bargaining, not as a tool for direct engagement. Even the threat of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty falls within this framework, something French President Emmanuel Macron warned against as a step that could destabilize the international system

Amid this escalation, the great paradox remains, such as that a state like Israel, which is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and possesses a nuclear arsenal not subject to any international supervision, launches a direct military attack on a state that is a member of the treaty, namely Iran, which, despite all the disagreements, has its nuclear facilities subject to partial supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Here, Tehran poses a legitimate question: Why is Israel allowed to possess a nuclear weapon outside the framework of international law, while it pursues Iran merely for a civilian nuclear program (according to its description?). Rather, it sees the Israeli attack itself as a justification for continuing enrichment and fortifying its nuclear facilities as part of its strategic deterrence tools. Perhaps the most prominent question currently being raised is: If Washington is able to end the direct conflict between Israel and Iran with a mere “word” from President Donald Trump, why is the war in Gaza not ended? The answer may lie in the complexities of political interests, the balances within Israel, and the desire of some parties to invest time to achieve negotiating gains. But in the end, there does not seem to be a real will for a comprehensive solution. Everyone, whether Iran, Israel, or… The United States, and everyone else is waging this conflict with the logic of “managing the crisis,” not ending it. Until this logic changes, Gaza will remain ablaze, Tehran will remain agitated, and Tel Aviv will remain in crisis, amidst a conflict with no end in sight